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To have a deep and thorough understanding of development is always a challenge to 
economists. It is recognized that while competition and efficiency is essential for 
development, ‘market failure’ is not less common than the ‘state failure’. That is why 
economists and other social researchers have had a lot of efforts to find the ways of 
explaining economic reform and development from the viewpoint of institutional 
economics.  
The centrally-planned economies (CPE) have faced more serious problems in transition. 
They have to deal with three key sets of reforms: liberalization and stabilization; 
institutional changes that support market exchange and shape ownership; and the 
establishment of social programs to ease the pain of transition (World Bank 1996). This 
general guideline does not, however, reflect all complexity of the transition process, as 
showed by the experience of a number of transition economies. As Jeffries (1993, p. i) 
mentions, ‘The rejection of central planning by so many countries in 1989 represents one of 
the truly extraordinary events in the history of economics. But the transition to the market 
also presents economists with formidable challenges because the path has never been trod 
before. The issues raised will remain at the top of the economic agenda for many years to 
come’. 
Since Doi Moi (Renovation) launched in 1986 and especially since the 1989 reforms, the 
face of Vietnam’s economy and society has changed significantly. Yet, it is now generally 
recognized that Vietnam is among the best developing countries in terms of achieving 
relatively high economic growth and reducing poverty incidence. And one of the main 
factors contributing to Vietnam’s success is prudent adjustments in the microeconomic 
foundations for supporting the private sector.
2 At the same time, some have argued that in 
international comparisons Vietnam’s performance is not so spectacular and moreover, there 
remain many problems for sustaining economic growth and ensuring quality of 
development.
3   
In fact, the process of economic reforms and Doi Moi in Vietnam has also been complicated 
and unsmooth. The complication of reform process seems to be continuing as Vietnam aims 
at ‘establishment of synchronous institutions of a market economy by socialism 
orientation’, which is considered a key dimension for successful implementation of the 
Socio-economic Development Strategy 2001-10.
4 
An examination of Vietnam’s experience is, therefore, to help enrich our understanding of 
the underlying political and economic determinants of transitional and developmental 
                                                        
2 See, for example, Arkardie and Mallon (2003) and  Joint Donor Report (2005). 
3 See, for example, Dapice (2003). Vietnam also recognizes that economic growth during 2000-05 was under 
its potential and the competitiveness of the economy was quite low. According to the World Economic 
Forum, Vietnam’s competitiveness is at the positioned 53/59 in 2000, 60/75 in 2001, 65/80 in 2002, 60/102 in 
2003, 77/104 in 2004 and 81/117 in 2005. 
4 CPV (2001).   3
process. It is also helpful for Vietnam to adjust her institutional reform process for getting 
better policies for development. With that purpose, this paper is about the economic reform 
process in Vietnam, in which the changes in institutions for supporting private sector 
development are taken as the focus of consideration.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II highlights the process of 
economic reform in Vietnam and its socio-economic achievements. Section III marks the 
salient features of changes in the microeconomic foundation to support private sector 
development. They include the recognition of private ownership, rights of doing business, 
and competition as well as the relaxation of restrictions related with the administrative 
procedure for business registration and sectoral-ownership conditions. Section IV 
emphasizes the problems of private sector’s access to production factor markets, its 
participation in infrastructure development and public services, and the enforcement of 
Competition Law. The key lessons from the whole reform process, including the 
microeconomic foundation improvements, are examined in the final section, Section V. 
II. Process of economic reforms, achievements and the role of private sector 
Since the reunification in 1975, the economic development and policy changes in Vietnam 
can be characterized by three periods (Figure 1).
 5  
Before the 1980s, Vietnam was essentially a CPE, following closely the Soviet model. 
Major characteristics of the economy included: (i) state or collective ownership of 
production means; (ii) government administered supply of physical input and output; (iii) 
lack of business autonomy, absence of factor markets, highly regulated goods and services 
markets; and (iv) a bias toward heavy industry in investments. Vietnam was also relatively 
autarkic, trading mostly with the former socialist countries. With the poor incentives and 
restricted information flows, the resource allocation was heavily distorted. The problems 
were further compounded by an unfavorable geopolitical context because of the military 
conflict with Cambodia in late 1978 and China in 1979. By the late 1970s, Vietnam was 
facing a ‘major economic crisis, with acute shortages of food, basic consumer goods, and 
inputs to agriculture and industry, and a growing external debt’ (ADB 1989, p. 6). The 
failure of the centrally-planned system had become apparent and pressures for economic 
reforms increased substantially. 
During the period 1980-87, the economy can be regarded as a modified-planned economy 
where some micro-reforms were undertaken to respond to depletion of the economy, but 
without any significant changes in macroeconomic management.  
                                                        
5 This Section is adapted from Vo Tri Thanh and Pham Hoang Ha (2004).   4
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De Vylder and Fforde (1988) have described the reform process as a ‘bottom up’ one. It 
was firstly initiated through partial, unofficial relaxation of constraints on private activity 
and spontaneous moves towards production and trade outside of official/plan channels (for 
example ‘illicit contracting’ in agriculture and ‘fence breaking’ in manufacturing sector),
6 
leading to eventual Party recognition of the role of the household sector in agriculture, 
handicrafts, and retail trading. In 1979, the Council of Ministers issued a decree providing 
scope for local state enterprises to operate outside the central plan once central plan targets 
had been realized
7. In January 1981, a contract system was introduced in the agricultural 
sector
8, and the government issued a decision providing limited autonomy to state 
enterprises
9. These micro-reforms enhanced voluntary and decentralized interactions 
between individual agents and created new incentives for producers in raising outputs 
during the period 1982-85. The economy became more dynamic and as a result, Vietnam 
enjoyed a rather high rate of economic growth in the first half of the 1980s (Figure 1).  
Although those micro-reforms in the period 1979-1985 exhibited a trend towards 
liberalization and an undermining of the state planning system, they were not a transition in 
real terms. The fifth Party Congress 1982 initiated attempts to recentralize the economy and 
in 1983, administrative changes were made to control ‘anarchy’ in the market; the freedom 
of state enterprises to trade outside of official/plan channels was narrowed. These moves 
reflected considerable internal debate within the Party about future policy directions. Such 
an uncertain environment checked the growth of non-state economic activity as it 
discouraged long-term investments. 
The improved economic growth was not to be sustainable. In September 1985, in a vain 
attempt to solve the problem of high free market prices, the authorities increased state 
prices, introduced a new currency and the so-called ‘price-salary-money reform’. These 
reforms were implemented without changing in fundamental problems of resource 
misallocation, trade restrictions and macroeconomic imbalances in the economy. As a 
result, these reforms failed to cut down inflation. In the mid-1980s, the inflation rate 
accelerated to several hundred percent. 
The year 1986 is recorded as the beginning of the transition because it represented an 
irreversible change in ideology. The Sixth Party Congress in December 1986 publicly 
rejected the fiction of trying to implement the central planning model, and instead declared 
its intention to move toward some form of mixed market economy (a multi-ownership 
structure). This included agreement on the need for policy reforms aimed at reducing 
                                                        
6 One interesting characteristic of the Vietnamese system is its pragmatic flexibility. This characteristic is 
believed to be built-up over three decades of fierce struggle against powerful enemies. This characteristic 
explains why such ‘fence breaking’ behaviors were more easily accepted in Vietnam than in other communist 
countries.  
7 Decree 279-CP (2/8/1979) ‘On Work to Promote the Production and Circulation of Commodities not under 
State Management and the Supply of Inputs or Raw Materials and Waste and Low Quality Materials at the 
Provincial Level’ 
8 Directive No. 100 of the Party Central Committee, 13 January 1981, ‘On Piece-work Contracts to Employee 
Groups and Individual Employees Working in Agricultural Cooperatives’ 
9 Decision No. 25-CP (21/1/1981) on ‘Several Directions and Measures to Enhance the Rights of Industrial 
State Enterprises to take Initiative in Production and Business and in Self-Financing.’   6
macroeconomic instability and accelerating economic growth, and that all ‘economic 
levers’ (price, wages, fiscal and monetary policies) were to be used to achieve these 
objectives.  
However, significant changes in this direction occurred only sometimes after the approval 
of the Doi Moi program by the Congress. 
From 1988-89 onwards, the economy has been an economy in transition, striving for 
industrialization and international integration. During 1988 and in early 1989, Vietnam 
adopted a radical and comprehensive reform package aimed at stabilizing and opening the 
economy, and enhancing freedom of choice for economic units and competition so as to 
change fundamentally its economic management system. The reforms included:
10 
-  almost complete price liberalization; 
-  large devaluation and unification of the exchange rate; 
-  increases in interest rates to positive levels in real terms; 
-  substantial reduction in subsidies to the SOE sector; 
-  agricultural reforms through replacement of cooperatives by households as the basic 
decision-making unit in production and security of tenure for farm families; 
-  encouragement of the domestic private sector and foreign direct investment (FDI); and  
-  removal of domestic trade barriers and creation of a more open economy. 
Macroeconomic stabilization was successful in conjunction with price liberalization, the 
changes in interest rate and exchange rate policies and at the same time, the relief of the 
fiscal burden. The improvement of monetary policy and the better use of monetary 
instruments played a key role in cutting down inflation.  
Since 1989, the structural reforms, such as the SOE and banking system reform and private 
sector promotion, have also been carried out, but not without problems (which shall be 
discussed in following sections).  
In parallel with the domestic reforms, the acceleration of the process of international 
economic integration has played a key role in enhancing efficiency and promoting 
economic growth. The trade regime has gradually liberalized (though it did not achieve 
neutrality in the incentive structure). Up to 2005, Vietnam has entered into 87 bilateral trade 
arrangements and 48 investment protection agreements, and had trade relations with 224 
countries/territories. In 1992, Vietnam signed a trade agreement with the European Union 
(EU). In 1995, Vietnam joined ASEAN and fulfilled the agreements under the AFTA in 
2006. Vietnam applied for WTO membership in 1995 and attained membership status in 
November 2006. In 1998, Vietnam became a member of the APEC. In 2000, Vietnam 
signed the Bilateral Trade Agreement with the United States and the agreement became 
effective in December 2001. Since 2002, Vietnam has also joined regional integration clubs 
such as ASEAN +1. These moves have created huge market access for Vietnamese 
                                                        
10Note that Land Law of 1988 and ‘Party Resolution 10,’ April 1988,  abandoned the collective farming 
system that had been introduced in the 1960s; Resolution 27/HĐBT of March and Decision 16/NQTƯ of July 
1988 officially encourage private enterprises; Law on foreign Investment 1987 to call for foreign investment. 
See also the next section.   7
entrepreneurs and played a key role in booming exports which is the main engine for 
growth in Vietnam.  
With the market-oriented reforms, the socio-economic achievements Vietnam recorded 
have been impressive. In 1989 inflation was under control and since then it has stood at 
single digit levels.
11 From 1990 to 1997, the GDP growth rate was maintained at around 8% 
per annum on average. The GDP growth rate, however, went down between 1997 and 1999, 
partly because of the Asian financial crisis, and partly because of the dissipation of reform 
effects. Since 2000, the economy has gradually regained its rather high growth rate. The 
export growth rate averaged 24% per year during 1990s and continued to be high over the 
last three years (2003: 19.1%; 2004: 33.2%; 2005: 21.6%). The poverty incidence has 
significantly reduced, from 70% by in the late of 1980s to 58% in 1993, 37 % in 1998 and 
further to 19.5% in 2004 (Figure 1 and Table 1). 
Table 1: Some major macroeconomic indicators, 1991-2005 
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
  2001  2002  2003  2004
  2005
a
GDP growth (%)      5.81     8.70     8.08     8.83     9.54     9.34     8.15     5.76     4.77     6.79     6.89     7.08     7.34     7.69  8.43
Inflation (%)  67.6  17.5  5.2  14.5  12.7  4.6  3.6  9.2  0.1  -0.6  0.8  4.0  3.0  9.5  8.4
Domestic S/GDP (%)    10.10   13.77   16.78   17.08   18.20   17,21   20.10   21.49   24.57   27.12   28.82   28,67   27,42   28,31  30,0
Investment/GDP (%)    15,00   17,64   24,26   25,48   27,14   28,10   28,30   29,05   27,63   29,61   31,17   33,22   35,44   35,58  38,9
FDI (US$ bill.) 
b  1.322  2.165  2.900  3.766  6.531  8.497  4.649  3.897  1.568  2.014  2.536  1.379  1.653  2.100  4.100
Export (US$ bill)  2.087  2.581  2.985  4.054  5.449  7.256  9.185  9.360 11.540 14.308 15.027 16.706 19.900 26.500  32.200
 -  Change (%)  -13.2  23.7  15.7  35.8  34.4  33.2  26.6  1.9  23.3  24.0  3.8  11.2  19.1  33.16  21.6
Import (US$ bill)  2.338  2.541  3.924  5.826  8.155 11.144 11.592 11.499 11.622 15.200 16.200 19.730 25.000 31.954  36.980
 -  Change (%)  -15.1  8.7  54.4  48.5  40.0  36.6  4.0  -0.8  1.1  30.8  3.4  19.73  26.7  27.81  15.5
 Total Trade/GDP  52.9  51.9  52.4  60.6  65.4  74.6  73.7  70.5  79.9  94.0  95.00  104.6  109.4  127.3  128.5
Note: a) Estimated figures; b) Total commitments of newly registered projects. 
Source: Data provided by General Statistical Office (GSO) and Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) 
and CIEM. 
 
The role of both foreign invested enterprises (FIE) and the (domestic) private sector in the 
economy has increased significantly. The FIE sector has become an integrated part of 
Vietnam’s economy with an increasing share in (current) GDP from nearly 0% in 1991 to 
15.9% in 2005. In 2005, this sector accounted for 34.5% of the total merchandise export 
value (57.4% if crude oil export is included) and 16.3% of total investment. Meanwhile, the 
share in GDP of the state sector increased from 31.2% in 1991 to 38.4% in 2005, while that 
of the non-state sector (dominated by the private sector) decreased from 68.9% in 1991 to 
45.7% in 2005. But this is largely explained by a sharp decline of the agricultural sector 
(from 40.5% GDP to 20.7%), where business units are basically households. Table 2 
indicates an increasing significance of the non-state sector in industry, especially in those 
where Vietnam has comparative advantages (labour-intensive manufacturing). The private 
sector became a major source of employment, absorbing as much as about 90% of 1.3 – 1.4 
million new labor market entrants each year. 
 
                                                        
11 In 2004 and 2005, inflation rate (measured by CPI) increased considerably, to 9.5% and 8.4% respectively 
from the low rates during 2000-03.   8
Table 2: Role of the non-state and FIE sectors in industry, 1998 and 2005 
  1998  2005 











By sector (% of a 
specific industry 
output) 
    Total  FDI  SOE  Non-state    FDI  SOE 
non-
state 
Total  100.00  34.68  43.38  21.94  100.00  37.16  34.32  28.51 
Mining industry  14.57  83.74  12.56  3.69  9.11  71.82  20.42  7.76 
  Mining of coal   1.21  0.74  97.81  1.45  1.44  1.86  96.47  1.67 
  Petroleum and natural gas  12.20  99.76  0.24  0.00  6.50  99.88  0.12  0.00 
  Metal ores  0.11  2.72  73.65  23.63  0.16  3.07  45.94  50.99 
  Stone and other mining  1.04  1.84  50.82  47.35  1.01  1.40  38.88  59.72 
Manufacturing  79.23  25.34  47.61  27.05  84.91  35.87  31.45  32.68 
  Food products & beverages  22.37  21.73  46.02  32.24  20.95  26.51  31.53  41.96 
  Tobacco products  2.84  0.50  99.12  0.38  2.57  1.83  97.37  0.80 
  Textiles  4.97  21.03  54.30  24.67  4.71  30.01  40.94  29.05 
  Wearing apparel  3.09  23.29  33.26  43.45  3.72  38.11  22.59  39.30 
 
Tanning & dressing of leather, 
leather products  4.58  45.25  29.63  25.11  4.58  59.26  12.70  28.04 
  Wood & wood products  1.88  9.36  20.67  69.97  1.87  18.54  11.80  69.66 
  Paper & paper products  2.06  12.75  52.23  35.02  2.06  17.18  32.79  50.03 
  Publishing & recorded media  1.19  1.83  89.49  8.68  0.93  3.24  86.82  9.94 
  Coke, refined petroleum products  0.06  0.00  0.00  100.00  0.12  43.65  0.00  56.35 
  Chemical & chemical products  5.74  27.35  62.73  9.92  5.32  41.95  40.58  17.47 
  rubber and plastic products  3.22  22.01  34.15  43.84  4.70  29.51  24.79  45.71 
  non-metallic mineral products  8.76  19.04  59.73  21.24  9.13  22.83  50.42  26.75 
  Basic metal  2.96  44.62  44.13  11.25  3.27  30.35  41.38  28.28 
 
Fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipments  2.98  28.45  15.42  56.13  3.75  31.15  11.68  57.17 
  Machinery and equipments  1.28  23.42  58.72  17.86  1.54  52.23  24.13  23.64 
  Office, accounting & computing  1.01  98.51  0.00  1.49  0.56  96.15  0.00  3.85 
  Electrical machinery & apparatus  1.74  33.79  52.10  14.10  2.76  45.69  38.89  15.43 
 
Radio and communication 
equipments and apparatus  2.37  81.36  17.27  1.37  2.26  78.52  11.80  9.68 
 
Medical, precision, optical 
instruments, watches, clocks  0.23  71.39  20.72  7.88  0.20  85.20  6.86  7.94 
  Motor vehicles  1.09  70.57  15.71  13.73  2.56  82.33  12.21  5.46 
  Other transport equipment  2.71  69.34  18.68  11.98  3.99  66.89  15.18  17.93 
  Furniture  2.01  26.75  7.90  65.35  3.26  40.66  5.24  54.11 
  Recycle  0.08  0.00  0.00  100.00  0.07  1.46  0.00  98.54 
Electricity, gas and water supply  6.20  0.36  99.53  0.11  5.98  2.79  96.25  0.96 
  Electricity and gas  5.63  0.17  99.79  0.03  5.59  2.73  96.41  0.86 
  Water  0.58  2.19  96.97  0.83  0.39  3.75  93.82  2.43 
Note: The choice of the year of 1998 is not only due to data availability, but because this is the year 
before the Enterprise Law was approved. 
Source: GSO and our estimates.  
 
However, Vietnam is currently facing great challenges. Vietnam is still a low-income 
economy in transition, striving to catch up with more advanced economies in the region.   9
While Vietnam has recorded remarkable achievements in socio-economic development, 
imbalances in growth have emerged. There are weaknesses and vulnerabilities in several 
areas such as in the SOE sector, the financial system, public investment, and the education 
and training system. Another concern is about the growing private sector being not 
associated with a redistribution of firms by size. This means that thriving firms are either 
small (in the case of the domestic private sector) or quite large (in the case of the FDI 
sector). This phenomenon has not only limit the positive spillover effects in the economy, 
but also suggests that there have been a lot of obstacles for private businesses to grow, and 
eventually make it to the top.    
The problem of poverty and income inequality also adds the risk of socio-economic 
instability, which may stall economic development. Vietnam can benefit substantially from 
its trade liberalization and international economic integration. But the existing problems 
and weaknesses may be exaggerated as the economy integrates deeply into the regional and 
world economy. The adjustment costs, especially in short run, during integration process 
could also be significant. 
III. Microeconomic foundation changes for supporting private sector development 
Since 1979 there have been three main steps of micro-reforms implemented: (i) the private 
ownership and rights of doing business were officially recognized; (ii) a series of legal 
frameworks on business/company types have been set up and implemented; and (iii) market 
entry has gradually been relaxed. These reforms have helped liberalize domestic resources 
(such as entrepreneurialism,
12 human resources, capital) for economic development.  
Recognition of private ownership, rights of doing business and competition 
Following the Sixth Congress, there was a gradual relaxation of the administrative 
constraints to private sector activity and to domestic trade. In early 1987, many of the 
checkpoints that had been established to limit domestic trade were reduced, and private 
markets for agricultural goods developed rapidly.
13 In March 1988, the Council of Ministers 
had issued a series of decrees clarifying the rights of the non-state sector to engage in 
industrial production.
14 These policy guidelines were reinforced by a Politburo Resolution 
in July 1988.
15 These policy guidelines recognized the important potential contribution of 
the non-state sector in industrial production, and explicitly stated that the state recognizes 
and protects the rights of the non-state sector to the ownership and inheritance of property 
and lawful earnings of non-state enterprises. 
                                                        
12 By comparing the statistics on the fraction of rural self-employment accounted for by non-farm activities 
Vietnam during the ‘Doimoi’ process, Joint Donor Report (2005) believed that this country is more 
entrepreneurial than many other countries, even China. 
13 The extent to which administrative constraints were relaxed varied considerably throughout the country 
depending on the actions of local level administrative authorities. 
14 Council of Ministers Decree 27, 28 and 29-HDBT, 9 March 1988, on ‘Rules and Policies on the Private 
Economic Sector in Industrial Production, Service Industries, Construction and Transport’, on ‘Rules and 
Policies on the Collective Economy in Industrial Production, Service Industries, Construction and Transport’, 
and ‘Rules and Policies on the Family Economy in Production and Service Activities’, respectively. 
15 Politburo Resolution 16/NQTW, 15 July 1988, on ‘Renovation of Management Policies and Mechanisms 
towards Non-state Economic Sectors’.   10
The Land Law (passed in December 1987 and enacted in 1988), and the Amended Law 
(passed in 1993) were an important step towards the introduction of property rights, 
recognizing private land-use rights (the state retains ownership). The Party Resolution 
No.10, passed in 1988, introduced a critically important reform. It greatly enhanced the 
rights of rural families, and diminished the legal authority of village cooperatives, providing 
for a much greater role for individuals and private enterprise in the agriculture sector. 
Farmers really owned their produce and could sell it in the free market. These moves, in 
combination with price and trade reforms, have contributed to sustained growth in 
agriculture since 1988 and been essential to poverty reduction as they provided income to 
some three-quarters of the population. 
It should be noted that until 1995, there was no legal framework (even in the Constitution) 
to specify and to guarantee and enforce the property rights. Consequently, there was some 
uncertainty about what actually was permissible and what would be permissible in the 
future. That uncertainty did not much retard investments by family businesses and farming 
activities, where investments mostly were small and short-term. Strong growth in the 
private sector's share of retail trade showed that even before formal institutions were 
established, changes were gradually occurring in informal institutions that substantially 
affected the way economic business was conducted. When formal institutions were not in 
place, economic behavior was mostly governed by informal institutions such as social 
norms and practices, and behaviors, and pressures to conform.
16 However, when the scope 
and scale of economic activities increase, those informal institutions can be costly for those 
unfamiliar with them and therefore, they could impose major obstacles for investment. A 
small-survey of enterprises conducted by World Bank confirmed that in the absence of 
formal institutions, firms have to apply a range of mitigation strategies to protect 
themselves from a contract breach, such as carefully selecting counterparts, keeping their 
contracts relatively short-term with an option to renew, limiting the size of an individual 
contract, or diversifying suppliers whenever possible (Joint Donor Report 2005). These 
practices are costly and not relevant for long-term and large scale investments. 
After having achieved remarkable results in the reform process and freed from threat of 
economic crisis, Vietnam needs long-term and large scale investment to sustain economic 
growth. This requires informal institutions be legalized to make the business environment 
more transparent and accountable. Responding to the demands of development, Vietnam’s 
National Assembly approved a newly amended Constitution in 1992, which was recognized 
                                                        
16 The small-scale survey of enterprises conducted by the World Bank shows that all the firms in the survey do 
indeed use some form of written contract to formalize their deals. However, none of them places much faith in 
the ultimate legal enforcement power of those contacts, nor do they seriously entertain the possibility of 
resorting to legal action if the other party violates its obligations. The main purpose of the contracts seems to 
be to minimize the room for misunderstanding between the parties. And although very few firms adhere 
strictly to their terms, suppliers generally attempt to fulfill them. They do so for the sake of building their 
reputation and boosting the goodwill of the contractor, rather than because they are concerned about the 
possibility of any legal consequences of a breach. Reputation, through repeated interaction, is the cornerstone 
of business-to-business deals in Vietnam. In virtually all cases, contractors and suppliers have known each 
other for a number of years, usually several times longer than the term of their business deal. In the small-
scale survey, 98 percent of the contracts were with suppliers that the contracting firm had known for three or 
more years, whereas the longest contractual agreement was for 12 months (Joint Donor Report 2005).   11
as a milestone in laying the foundations for the private sector to compete with the state 
sector (Government of Vietnam 1992). The Constitution acknowledges private ownership 
and provides guarantees against nationalization (Article 23), states that foreign investment 
and trade are to be encouraged (Articles 24 and 25), and specifies that SOEs should be run 
autonomously and be accountable for their performance (Article 19). Property rights and 
private ownership were further detailed in the first Civil Code 1995. The Code not only 
confirms the protection of lawful property right and private ownership, but also covers 
provisions on the establishment of property rights, and provisions on transactions in and 
transfers of these rights and property. 
However, it was recognized even in 1996 that the reforms were not keeping pace with 
economic development. The reform process in general slowed down during the period 
1996-99, especially after the Asian crisis. Note that the Asian crisis was seen differently in 
Vietnam. While many have maintained that the crisis has simply reinforced the importance 
of further reform, others have emphasized the dangers of exposure to global markets in 
terms of social stability and sovereignty. The slowdown in the reform process discouraged 
foreign investors who had greatly believed in Doi Moi. FDI inflows decreased sharply. 
Newly licensed capital declined on average by 24% annually, while implemented capital 
decreased on average by 14% per year (Le Xuan Ba 2006). As a result, economic growth 
went down and reached a trough of 4.8% in 1999.  
The slowdown in economic growth in late 1990s put more pressure on reform.
17 The reform 
process was then powered by promulgating Enterprise Law in 1999, which has been 
recognized as one of the most fundamental reforms in business law of Vietnam.  
First, the Law officially acknowledges the right of doing business: ‘Citizens are free to do 
business in all business areas not prohibited by Law’. The Law has helped harness 
Vietnam’s economic potential and removed constraints which hindered innovation and 
creativity in business. The Law has also revitalized entrepreneurship and strengthened the 
trust of investors and entrepreneurs in the reforms and policies initiated by the Party and 
Government. 
Second, the Law has brought about a fundamental shift in the approach and tools with 
which the government manages enterprises. Prior to the Enterprise Law 1999, it was 
believed that ‘the freedom to do business should only be broadened along with and within 
the expansion in governance and monitoring capacity of authorities’. This view has receded 
and has been replaced by a more innovative thinking. The Law implicitly set up a new 
principle that ‘management and governance capacity of the Government authorities should 
be strengthened and developed to the point that it can promote and manage development 
process’. The old management style which focused on inspection and monitoring is 
gradually being replaced with one that leans more towards cooperation and facilitation. 
                                                        
17 However, in a long war against the most powerful enemies (1945-1975) Vietnamese Communists proved 
their capacity to adapt to difficult situations.  They were resolved in their target but willing to change their 
strategy to match the requirements of new situations, as long as these strategies served the targets. Capacity to 
adapt has been acknowledged as one of the important characteristics of Vietnamese leadership in the Doi Moi 
process (Arkadie and Mallon 2003)   12
Such reform is tge impetus for accelerating administrative reforms and enhancing the 
capacity of public authorities to be in line with market economy requirements.  
Ex-prime Minister Phan Van Khai said in his annual business meeting 13-14 September 
2001 in Hanoi that ‘…coupled with the policy ‘Khoan 10’ (Resolution 10 in 1988) which 
helped to liberalized the freedom and the production potential in rural and agricultural 
economy, the acknowledgement of the role of rural households in agriculture production 
has enabled Vietnam to graduate from a rice importer to the second largest rice exporter in 
the world. Of no less importance than the policy, the Enterprise Law has been a 
breakthrough in institutional reforms, enabling liberalization of production forces in urban 
areas through the development of private enterprises’. 
Table 3: Formal Laws on Governing Business entities 
 
Laws  Dates laws approved,  
amended or replaced 
Categories of business entities 
or arrangement addressed 
Companies  Enacted December 1990 
Amended June 1994 
Replaced in January 2000 
Amended and Unified in Enterprise 
Law in November 2005 
Joint stock companies 
Private limited liability companies  
Private Enterprises  Enacted December 1990 
Amended June 1994 
Replaced in January 2000 
Amended and Unified in Enterprise 
Law in November 2005 
Private Unlimited liability Enterprises 
Enterprise Law   Approved April 1999 
Enacted January 2000 
Amended and Unified in Enterprise 
Law in November 2005 
All private Enterprises 
Allows State enterprises to be 
incorporated 
Civil Code  Approved October 1995 
Amended November 2005 
All business entities 
Sate enterprises   Approved April 1995 
Amended and Unified in Enterprise 
Law in November 2005 
Entities with sate invested capital (State 
corporations, Public Service Enterprises, 
and Business Enterprises.)  
Cooperatives  March 1996  Cooperatives 
Financial Institutions  Approved November 1997  Banks and other financial institutions 
Insurance Services  Approved May 2000  Entities providing insurance 
Bankruptcy Law   Approved December 1993  All business entities 
Commercial Code  Approved May 1997 
Amended in November 2005 
All business entities 
Environmental 
Protection 
Approved December 1993 
Amended November 2005 
All business entities 
Land Law  Approved December 1987 
Amended November 1993 
Amended December 2001 
Applied differently to different entities. 
Labor Code  Approved June 1994  Applies differently to different entities. 
Promotion of Domestic 
Investment 
Approved June 1994 
Amended April 1998 
Amended and Unified in Enterprise 
Law  
All domestically owed business entities. 
Foreign Investment  Approved December 1987 
Amended June 1990 
Amended December 1992 
Amended April 1997 
Amended May 2000 




Business cooperation contracts 
Build-operate-transfer project 
 
Law on competition  Approved December 2004  All business entities   13
Enacted July 2005 
Unified Enterprise Law  Approved November 2005 
Enacted July 2006 
Joint-stock company  
Limited liability company 
Private company  
Partnership company 
Common Law on 
Investment 
Approved November 2005 
Enacted July 2006 
All business entities regardless their 
nationalities. 
Law on Intellectual 
Property. 
Approved November 2005 
Enacted July 2006 
All business entities 
Source: CIEM/UNDP (2001) and CIEM (2006). 
 
In fact, the Enterprise Law has expanded the autonomy and the ability for initiative in 
regards to an enterprise’s operations while at the same time creating a legal basis ensuring a 
more transparent relationship between the State and enterprises. The business environment 
has become more predictable and less risky and the investors are more willing to invest. It 
has resulted in a boom in business activities in all fields and contributed a great deal to 
Vietnam’s economic recovery and growth, to job creation and poverty reduction. 
Statistics from the Agency for Small and Medium Enterprise Development reveal that 
160,672 private enterprises were registered during the 2000-05 period. This is 3.2 times 
more than the total number of private enterprises registered during 1991-99. Accumulated 
capital registered by new enterprises amounts to nearly VND 321,200 billion (around USD 
20 billion). This figure does not include the additional capital registered by existing 
enterprises due to expansion of their business, which is estimated around USD 6.3 billion.  
 
Box 1: Key Contents of Enterprise Law 2005 (be effective on 1
st July 2006 ) 
The core ideas of the Enterprise Law 2005 is further simplifying the procedures and reducing 
obstacles to market entry for non-state enterprises. The constraint of ownership (30%) for foreign 
investment is fundamentally abolished, except for some restricted industries and areas.  
According to Enterprise Law 2005, newly established SOEs have to apply the Law immediately, 
while the existing enterprises have to transform management organization and operation in the 
forms of limited liability or joint-stock company as stipulated by the Law (the transition deadline 
is subject to annual schedules, but should be completed within four years from 1
st July 2006). The 
existing FIEs are permitted to either re-register within two years, or continue operating with the 
granted license.  
The Law for the first time covers regulations on company groups (including holding–subsidiary 
company, business group and other forms). In general, the objective of the regulations on 
company group is to set up legal grounds for the development of large-scale companies, make 
business operation transparent, and to protect the interest of minority shareholders. A noteworthy 
point is that the Law clearly stipulates responsibility of the holding company over subsidiaries, 
such as loss compensation for the subsidiary company in some cases.
18  
The regulations on corporate governance are more in line with international corporate governance 
                                                        
18 For example, beyond-authority interference of the owner, member or shareholder, as well as forcing 
subsidiary company to do business in contrary to business practices or to carry out non-profit activity without 
satisfactory compensation, resulting to the loss of the subsidiary company. 
19 For example, they are required to inform the company accurately and in a timely fashion about the 
enterprises in which they or their relatives share ownership or equity or controlling equity (Article 119); 
explain works carried out by the manager in their own name or in other’s name within the scope of the 
company business, which can only be performed if approved.   14
standards, and are uniformly applied to all domestic and foreign invested enterprises. The 
regulations on disclosure and transparency are significantly widened, especially the regulations 
on managers
19 and related parties.  
State administration over enterprises is also reformed. In order to strengthen the coordination 
among state agencies, the Law requires these agencies to provide information for each other. 
 
Based on the widely recognized successes of the Enterprise Law 1999, the (unified) 
Enterprise Law 2005 was approved by National Assembly in December 2005 and came into 
effect on 1
st July 2006. The new Law governs not only private enterprises, but also joint-
stock companies, limited liability companies, limited-liability companies with one-person 
membership, and partnership companies regardless of the ownership. In content, the 
Enterprise Law 2005 inherits and further expands the reforms that were introduced 
successfully by the Enterprise Law 1999 (Box 1).  
In regard to the investment environment for FDI, one year after launching Doi Moi Vietnam 
promulgated the first Law on Foreign Investment in 1987. Since then the Law has 
undergone four amendments and supplements in 1990, 1992, 1996 and 2000, and finally 
unified in (common) Law on Investment in December 2005 (Box 2). The evolution of the 
Law on Foreign Investment shows Vietnam’s priority to FDI and her willingness to change 
to win in international competition for FDI. Undoubtedly, this Law and its amendments and 
supplements have significantly contributed to an improved investment environment, 
technological progress and economic development in Vietnam. 
 
Box 2: Key Contents of Law on Investment 2005 (effective on 1
st July ) 
The ruling position and guidance in development of the Investment Law are to abolish 
discrimination between investors of all forms of ownership, between domestic and foreign 
investors, to respect the freedom of business, and the investors’ right of self-determination in 
making management decisions. The law also provides fundamental changes in the state 
administration of investment and business activities in the direction of minimizing administrative 
intervention, ensuring favorable conditions for investors and merchants, and adopts the principle 
of National Treatment (NT) and Most Favored Nation (MFN) as stipulated in international 
treaties, of which Vietnam is a member. 
The law stipulates that investors, regardless of whether domestic or foreign, have the right of self-
determination in investment-business; the right of selecting investment sector, investment, capital 
mobilization form or choosing investment partner; the right of doing simultaneous business in 
various sectors, including export, import, advertising, processing and re-processing; the right of 
purchasing foreign currency; the right of transferring capital or investment projects; the right of 
raising a mortgage with land-use rights and land-attached assets; the right of remittance of capital 
and assets abroad; the right of accessing and using resources including capital, credit, land and 
natural resources; and other rights of the investor such as access to economic, legal and policy 
information and access to services on the principle of non-discrimination. 
Investment Law 2005 stipulates that the State shall protect investors in respect to their capital and 
property; protect intellectual property rights; ensure that fees and charges controlled by the 
Government are equal for both domestic and foreign-invested enterprises; guarantee lawful 
interests of the investor in case the State changes its policies and regulations, and ensure that 
disputes will be settled properly.   15
The stipulation on investment support and preference is a selective inheritance of provisions of 
the Law on Domestic Investment Encouragement (1998) and Law on Foreign Investment (1996). 
Most of the conditions for entitling investment preferences remain unchanged.
20 The new 
investment law adds economic zone into the list of localities with investment preference, which 
has originated from practical needs. 
The investment incentives and support measures under the Law on Domestic Investment 
Encouragement (1998) and Law on Foreign Investment (1996) are basically ‘transferred’ to the 
Investment Law 2005 as ‘general reference’.  
However, the Law still maintains some reasonable and legitimate discrimination between 
Vietnamese and foreign investors. This discrimination is subject to the agreed roadmap of 
implementation of international commitments in international treaties, to which Vietnam is a 
member. These differentiations are employed widely in many countries and are believed to 
protect special national interests, ensuring security and sovereignty, legitimately protecting 
domestic production. These discrimination measures are limited and shall gradually decline in 
accordance with the roadmap specified in the bilateral and multilateral commitments signed by 
Vietnam. 
 
However, FDI inflows have significantly declined since 1997 and only started to recover 
after 2000 (Table 1). Apart from the objective factors and weaknesses of infrastructure, the 
legal framework on investment and business still had a number of limitations, which have 
continuously been claimed by foreign investors. This is largely reflected in discrimination 
between domestic and foreign investors. Before enactment of Law on Investment 2005, 
there were two investment laws in Vietnam separately governing foreign investors (Law on 
Foreign Investment 1987) and local investors (Law on Domestic Investment 
Encouragement), which covered different systems of incentives and supports. In addition, 
investment laws and policies in general do not ensure transparency, openness and 
predictability in the long run.
21 Moreover, administrative barriers have also discouraged not 
a few investors, making Vietnam’s investment environment less attractive than some other 
countries in the region (Joint Donor Report 2005). 
In order to match domestic polices with international commitments, especially with 
commitments to WTO, which require outlawing all forms of discrimination against foreign 
products and businesses, a series of 29 laws were approved in 2004-05. The important laws 
include the Civil Code amended 2005, the Competition Law 2004, the (common) Law on 
Investment 2005, the (unified) Enterprise Law 2005, the Commercial Code amended 2005, 
the Law on Export and Import Tax amended 2005, the Law on Intellectual Property 2005, 
the Law on Electronic Transactions, the Law on Bidding, the Law on Practicing Thrift and 
Fighting against Waste in Public Expenditures, the Law on Prevention of and Fighting 
against Corruption, the State Audit Law, and the Intellectual Property Law. By 
                                                        
20 For example, eight preferential investment groups are clearly listed in Article 27. These sectors are selected 
in compliance with the industry structure development strategy and reasonable priority in the context of 
integration. Localities with socio-economic difficulties or special difficulties, industrial zones, export-
processing zones, hi-tech zones remain geo-economic zones entitled further preference for development. 
21 According to World Bank (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2004/tables.asp), governance 
indicators (with five headings: governance effectiveness,  regulatory quality, voice and accountability, rule of 
law and control of corruption) in Vietnam are far lower than that of neighboring countries in ASEAN such as 
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. However these indicators have steadily improved since 1996.     16
promulgating these laws, Vietnam has been widely acknowledged as having basically 
established necessary ‘legal’ institutions for a market economy. The Law on Investment, 
the Enterprise Law, and the Competition Law are expected to contribute significantly to 
improvement of business environment in Vietnam and a new boom in foreign and private 
investments through: 
-  creating a more level playing field for all investors based on fundamental principles of 
WTO, such as national treatment, most favored nation, openness and transparency; 
-  settling and mitigating difficulties and obstacles to market entry, ensuring investors’ 
freedom to invest in areas not prohibited by law; and 
-  improving transparency and accountability in implementing State’s role on management 
by separating state management and business management. The State is supposed to 
play the role of supporting enterprises, providing effective legal framework and 
ensuring strict enforcement of law without directly intervention in business 
management of the enterprise. 
In relation to competition regulation, before promulgation of the Competition Law in 2004, 
there had been some provisions related to anticompetitive and unfair competitive practices 
in specific areas and to protection of lawful interests of consumers.
22 In practice, these rules 
were poorly enforced and had an insignificant effect on competition environment. On 3 
December, the National Assembly approved the Competition Law which came into effect 
on 1 July 2005. This law marks an important milestone in the process of establishing and 
developing a fair competitive environment in the economy. The Law, in general, regulates 
anti-competitive and unfair competitive practices, and procedures and remedies applied to 
complaints on competition. All business activities are subject to the Law, including 
domestic private enterprises, SOEs, and FIEs operating in sectors/areas of production, 
distribution, public service, even industry and profession associations. Notably, the 
Competition Law also applies to State administrative agencies, in case their practices are 
harmful for competition in doing business. 
It should be noted that these improvements in the legal environment for economic activity 
result in part from good dialogue between the business community and government 
agencies. Since 2000, the Vietnamese Government has maintained a direct dialogue with 
business community through three levels. The highest level brings together representatives 
from a number of business associations and a range of line ministries and government 
agencies. It is organized twice a year under the name of Vietnam Business Forum (VBF). 
These regular gatherings have led to the identification of a series of policy priorities for 
business development. Participation by the highest national authorities allows the business 
community to convey its views and concerns in an effective manner. The second level of 
policy dialogue is between specific ministries or agencies and the relevant stakeholders in 
                                                        
22 These rules are stipulated in separate legal documents. The Commercial Law (1997) contains several 
provisions to protect consumers and restrain in unfair competitive practices. Decree 54/2000/CP, dated 3 
October 2000 by the Government, sets out regulations on the protection of intellectual property rights 
regarding trade secrets, geographical indication, trade names and protection against unfair competitive 
practices relating to intellectual property.    17
the business community. These exchanges occur mainly in the process of drafting new laws 
or decrees, and are becoming more regular over time. The third level involves provincial 
authorities and the corresponding business community. These exchanges are aimed at 
improving the local investment environment and attracting investors to the province.    
Table 4 shows the encouraging investment response by foreign and private business 
community to Vietnam’s reforms since 2000. 
Table 4: GDP and investment growth rate by ownership 1996 - 2005 (%) 
 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
GDP  9.34  8.15  5.76  4.77  6.79  6.89  7.08  7.34  7.79  8.43 
State  34.2  20.1  15.3  16  16.2  13.7  7.8  8.2  17.9  5.9 
Non-state 3.8  8.1  7.8  11.2  9.7  11  32.5  28  19.6  15.7  Investment 
FDI  -1.7  28.3  -23.8 -8.5  19.9  10.2  13.4  5.6  14.7  16.4 
Source: GSO various volumes and CIEM (2005), CIEM (2004). 
Relaxation of market entry restrictions 
Resolution 100 in agriculture and then resolution 10 in 1988, Civil Code 1995 and the 
Enterprise Law are milestones in the process of recognizing the private ownership and right 
of doing business in Vietnam. The Investment Climate Survey (ICS) conducted by the 
World Bank shows that only 5.5% of ICS correspondents see the legal system as a severe or 
major constraint in Vietnam, compared to about a quarter elsewhere in the region or in the 
world (Joint Donor Report 2005). This reaffirms that institutional reforms in the legal 
framework related to private ownership and rights of doing business have won credibility 
with business entrepreneurs. In return, the private sector has increasingly confirmed its role 
in process of economic development in Vietnam, especially in creating of jobs and 
improving income. 
However recognizing private ownership and rights of doing business is only a necessary 
condition for business development. Vietnam would not score remarkable achievements in 
promotion non-state business if they had not removed many market entry restrictions. 
These restrictions are mainly administrative procedures for business registration, granting 
favorable conditions for SOEs, and sectoral-ownership conditions.  
Administrative procedures for business registration 
In developing countries administrative procedures are key restrictions on making business 
ideas come true. In Vietnam, simplification of the procedures for business registration and 
business establishment is considered one of the breakthroughs of the Enterprise Law 1999, 
reflected in three aspects.  First, the procedures and documentation for the establishment of 
enterprises have been simplified.  According to empirical data, the time it takes to establish 
an enterprise has been reduced from 90 days from the receipt of proper documentation to 
seven days on average. In addition, the cost of business registration has been significantly 
reduced, from an average of VND 10 million to about VND 500,000 (GTZ, CIEM and 
UNDP 2005).  Second, the Law clearly defines the rights of the State as well as the rights of 
State officials vis a vis the rights of the investor and the enterprise, having the effect of   18
gradually reducing the tendency by State bodies to over-administer and create hassles for 
enterprises.  Third, 159 business licenses have been abolished, removing a significant 
amount of unreasonable administrative barriers on the operations of enterprises.   
The ICS conducted by The World Bank shows that only 1% of the ICS respondents in 
Vietnam see licenses and permits as a ‘severe’ or a ‘major’ constraint, compared to an 
average of about 15 percent elsewhere, both in the region and across all developing 
countries. This positive perception is a testimony to the dramatic simplifications in business 
registration introduced by the Law. A survey of enterprises jointly conducted by CIEM and 
the GTZ also confirms this perception. The Enterprise Law requires business registration 
process to be completed within 15 days. The CIEM-GTZ study found that this deadline was 
respected in two thirds of the cases, with only 5 percent of enterprises having to wait for 30 
days or more. In many provinces the registration process was actually completed in less 
than one week. Similarly, 70 percent of the companies surveyed received their tax code 
within seven days, and only 6 percent of them had to wait for more than 15 days. 
According to the ICS for Vietnam, the government agencies are considered by respondents 
as relatively cordial. Respondents were asked to choose, among a long list of options, the 
two agencies which had been the most supportive, and the two which had been the least 
helpful. At one end of the spectrum, District People’s Committees were perceived as the 
friendliest, followed by the Business Registration and Licensing offices under the 
Department of Planning and Investment. An insignificant number of correspondents 
claimed these two agencies were unhelpful. The Traffic police came at the other end, 
followed by the Market controller and land administration agency which received almost no 
support from entrepreneurs. The Labor and social security, Product quality registration, Fire 
and building safety agencies on average received more good comments than bad ones, 
while the Tax authority, Municipal police, Customs department, Department of 
construction and Environmental agency were perceived as unhelpful rather than helpful but 
the differences were not very large (Joint Donor Report 2005). These findings prove that 
administrative procedures do not hinder business development in Vietnam, as has been 
common wisdom. By contrast, government agencies in Vietnam have gained confidence 
from the business community and become a real friend for entrepreneurs. Table 5 provides 
a comparative view of Vietnam’s business environment. Here, it is useful to focus on what 
is perceived as ‘severe’ or ‘major’ constraints for the growth of business, out of a list 
including 18 possibilities.  
There are only 3 out of 18 criteria in which Vietnam is claimed to have a more binding 
constraint than the world and East Asian countries. ‘Labor skill and education’ and ‘cost of 
finance’ criteria are roughly the same as in the world/East Asia (to be precise, the skills 
constraint is only marginally more important in Vietnam than it is worldwide; and it is not 
more severe in statistical terms than in other East Asian countries), while for 13 other 
criteria Vietnam is significantly better than the world and East Asian economies. 
Interestingly these 13 criteria are related mainly to administrative procedures. Hence, it can 
be said that reforms in microeconomic foundations have greatly improved the business 
environment in Vietnam.    19
 
Table 5: Binding constraint in Vietnam and elsewhere 
Constraint  East Asia  Vietnam  The World 
Access to finance  17.4**  37.4  30.1** 
Access to land  9.9**  26.4  14.5** 
Labor skill and education  23.8  22.3  20.4* 
Transportation  15.2**  21.6  12.4** 
Cost of finance  20.2  21.3  36.1 
Macroeconomic instability  34.1**  16.8  40.2** 
Electricity  24.4**  15.7  24.4** 
Policy uncertainty  32.5**  14.7  40.2** 
Tax rates  28.2**  13.8  40.5** 
Corruption  28.6**  12.8  36.8** 
Customs and trade regulations  20.1**  12.5  21.6** 
Anti-competitive behavior  21.6**  12.3  29.7** 
Labor relations  17.4**  10.9  17.3** 
Tax administration  22.4**  8.7  32.4** 
Telecommunications  12.9**  6.5  10.3** 
Legal system  27.3**  5.5  21.6** 
Crime and theft  19.3**  4.0  25.7** 
Licenses and permit  14.4**  1.4  15.9** 
Source: Joint Donor Report (2005, Table 4.1). Figures indicate the percentage of firms which consider that 
constraint is either major or severe. Figures for East Asian are based on observations from Cambodia, China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Figures for the world include 57 developing countries and 
transition economies but exclude Vietnam. An asterisk indicates that the figure is statistically different from 
that for Vietnam at 90 percent confidence level; two asterisks indicate 99 percent confidence level. 
 
Note that trading rights have also gradually been ensured during the process of Vietnam’s 
trade liberalization and integration. Before 1989 trade was essentially characterized by state 
monopoly. Since 1989, the entry into trading activities has been somewhat relaxed, 
although up to 1997 the conditions for entry were still very restrictive. The abolition of 
trade licenses in 1998 was a most significant step forward in trade liberalization. From then 
on all domestic enterprises have been allowed to trade freely most commodities/items, 
except for a few items prohibited or under specialized management. The number of 
enterprises registered for trading activities increased from 2,400 in the early of 1998 to 
about 30,000 in 2005. Since 2002, the FIEs have been granted the right to export goods 
other than those they produce. 
Reform and equitization of the SOEs  
Before Doi Moi, the SOEs played a crucial role in Vietnam’s economy and the role of the 
private sector was quite trivial. In transition to a market economy, there is the widely-held 
belief that public firms have been mismanaged and squandering assets and resources. 
Consequently, privatization is recommended as the only way to improve the performance of   20
SOEs. Vietnam recognized the inefficiency of the SOE sector, but she has attempted to 
‘restructure and/or equitize SOEs’ rather than ‘privatizing’ them.  
In the early 1990s, in order to make the operation of the SOEs viable, Government reduced 
substantially subsidies, diminished ‘cheap’ credit to these enterprises and gave them greater 
autonomy. Furthermore, inefficient and money-losing enterprises were liquidated. From 
1990 to 1994, the number of SOEs fell from 12000 to 6300, and 1.5 million SOE workers 
(out of the 4.05 million total SOE employees) retired or were converted to part-time 
workers. These reforms led to some positive improvements in the growth performance of 
the SOE sector in the first half of the 1990s. But even then it was recognized that the 
reforms of SOEs and the financial sector had been limited and have not kept pace with 
economic development. In the second half of 1990s, these reforms stagnated in line with the 
slowdown in overall economic reform.  
Vietnam has gained some progress in restructuring the SOEs sector. In 2001 there were 
5355 SOEs, of which 1997 enterprises are under control of central government. During 
2001-05, Vietnam restructured 3572 SOEs, of which 2378 SOEs were equitized (Table 6). 
However, these equitized SOEs accounted for only less than 10% of total state capital in 
SOEs
23. Moreover, in general, during 2001-05 the pace of SOE reform was slower than was 
planned. Even in 2005, as the SOE reform has accelerated, the number of equitized SOEs 
represents only 70% of the planned. After 20 year of transition from a centrally-planned 
economy to a market-oriented economy, the Government of Vietnam retains cumbersome 
SOEs.  
Table 6: The process of restructuring SOEs 2001-2005 
Types  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2001-05 
  Enterprises equitized  205  164  532  753  724  2378 
  Enterprises Transferred  18  34  51  24  12  139 
  Enterprises sold  16  17  24  19  18  94 
  Enterprises merged  85  83  154  68  40  430 
  Unified enterprises  34  44  48  7  10  143 
  Enterprises dissolved  22  27  50  35  30  164 
  Enterprises bankrupted    2  4  12  12  30 
  Transformed to one-member 
limited liabilities companies 
    14  41  60  115 
  Newly established    37  18  12  12  79 
Total  380  408  895  971  918  3572 
Source: Data provided by MPI. 
The good news is that according to a survey of the performance of equitized enterprises 
with sample of 445 enterprises conducted by CIEM (CIEM and World Bank 2005), 87.5% 
enterprises confirmed their performance in terms of profitability, and their financial state 
was better or much better than before equitization. Specifically, the turnover and profit after 
tax of equitized enterprises in the first year after equitization increased by 13% and 48.8% 
                                                        
23  See Saigon Times Weekly, No 48-2005 (780), 24 November 2005.   21
respectively.
24 Furthermore, 96% of equitized enterprises confirmed that after equitization, 
the managers were more concerned about profitability and more proactive in seeking profit.   
There have also been several new dimensions of SOE reform since 2005. The first is the 
decision to cement the equitization of SOEs by listing them in the stock market and to 
equitize the large SOEs and some General Corporations (GCs). So far, some big SOEs have 
been equitized (e.g. Vietnam Milk Corporation and Song Hinh-Vinh Son Hydropower 
Plant). The second is to transform big SOEs and GCs into the so-called holding-subsidiary 
companies and there have been 47 entities transformed into companies following this 
model. The third is to establish and develop Business Groups on the foundation of GCs. On 
this basis, Vietnam Post and Telecommunication Group, Vietnam Coal Group, and Vietnam 
Textile and Garment Group were established. The expectation is that the holding-subsidiary 
companies and the business groups can take advantage of internal linkages, large scale and 
diversity of ownership to be more efficient and more competitive. The fourth is to have a 
pilot equitization of two state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), the Bank for Foreign 
Trade of Vietnam (Vietcombank) and the Housing Bank of Mekong Delta. The preparation 
process is to be completed and their stocks are expected to be sold in the early of 2007. 
The SOE reform is coming into a very decisive moment. Some concerns have been raised 
about the future efficiency of the new holding-subsidiary companies and business groups. 
There are also difficulties in terms of political economy, which cannot be simplified 
(Painter 2005). It is, however, believed that the SOE reform will be progressed in a more 
effective way.  The two new laws, the Common Law on Investment and the Unified 
Enterprise Law, and deep economic integration (e.g. WTO accession) are new grounds for 
pushing this process forward.  
IV. Major issues for further development of the private sector 
The improvements in microeconomic market foundations mentioned in Section III do not 
mean perfection. A lot of problems remain and Vietnam should continue to think of further 
improvements. There are other major obstacles for private firms to develop, including 
difficulty in accessing to resources such as land and credit, and a state-enterprise monopoly 
in some key sectors. Furthermore,  as Vietnam is now integrated more deeply into the world 
economy, the obstacles for private sector development may not originate from 
administrative agencies, but from unfair competition in the market due to the weakness of 
the legal system. Consequently, the sustainable development of the private sector also 
depends on two important things: the competitiveness of firms and the efficient 
enforcement of a (good) Competition Law. 
Access to key production factor markets 
One of the critical determinants in the expansion of the private sector in Vietnam is access 
to appropriate financing resources (Table 5) to fund medium- and long-term investments. It 
has been estimated that in 2005 around 80% of private companies in Vietnam had access to 
external sources of finance (Joint Donor Report 2005). However private sources of finance 
                                                        
24 Interestingly, according to this survey, among equitized enterprises, proportion of ‘better’ replies in 
enterprises where the state held a dominant share was lowest.      22
from retained earnings, and resources from family and friends remained an important 
source. According to a JBIC survey, more than 80% of private firms relied on their own 
funds at the time of founding the company, and 60% of them cited family, relatives and 
friends as the second source for procuring investment funds (JBIC 2002). Where private 
companies are able to access bank loans, this is often in the form of short-term credit, 
primarily for working capital or trading needs, rather than for more long-term fixed capital 
investment needs.   
As numerous studies have pointed out, unfavourable access to bank loans, and particularly 
long-term credit, relative to the state enterprise sector has been one of the major obstacles 
faced by the private sector. A number of factors are frequently cited to explain this 
phenomenon, both in terms of banks’ willingness to lend to the private sector and private 
firms’ ability to meet minimum lending requirements, including: 
-  the high degree of opacity surrounding companies’ financial accounts (largely a by-
product of the existing tax regime that motivates firms to under-report their activities in 
a bid to reduce their tax exposure), which makes it difficult for credit officers in banks 
to make a full credit assessment; 
-  banking regulations that inadvertently inhibit the expansion of banking business into the 
private sector;  
-  the small scale and fairly primitive stage of some private companies; 
-  when applying for a bank loan, many private companies lack viable business plans, or 
coherent strategies on how they intend to invest the credit; 
-  banks are sometimes reluctant to make the kinds of comparatively small loans required 
by private firms, because of the relatively higher transaction costs involved; 
-  the collateral requirements can be quite demanding for private firms in Vietnam, and 
many companies simply lack sufficient assets to provide as security for bank loans; 
-  banking regulations pertaining to bankruptcy and loan collateral (and taking possession 
of collateral after a lender defaults) remain undeveloped or difficult to enforce;  
-  although financial depth in Vietnam in last decade has developed remarkably, it still 
does not match that of her neighbors (e.g. Thailand, China and Malaysia), and this 
hinders banks in making loans to the private sector where this is perceived as risky; and     
-  lack of access to land (see next section), an essential ingredient in mortgage finance, is 
also a key obstacle for enterprises.  
According to ICS, across all institutional types and sizes of enterprises, only 54 percent of 
respondents to the ICS declared that they had the right to sell or mortgage the piece of land 
they had acquired recently. And only 10 percent of them were located in what they 
considered to be their own land. Therefore, solving this problem is a key task for future 
reforms, thus helping the private sector and the business community to have better access to 
one of the most important inputs for their development.  
As indicated in Table 5, access to land is significantly more difficult than average in the 
world and in East Asia. The survey of enterprises jointly conducted by CIEM and GTZ   23
(cited above) suggests that before an enterprise can be in operation, it needs to go through 
13 administrative procedures, taking 260 days altogether. Of this, 231 days correspond to 
the time needed to acquire land, under the assumption that the enterprise wants to purchase 
it from the government and needs to go through land clearance and compensation for 
resettled populations. Getting land in an industrial zone would reduce the waiting period, on 
average, from 231 days to 83. These figures show that access to land is the most time-
consuming procedure in setting up a new business in Vietnam.  
There are several key problems. First, before 1987, private persons were allocated a parcel 
of land for their lives and work without any official right of use or ownership. The right of 
using land was supported by unofficial institutions; local officials knew which piece of land 
or property ‘belonged’ to whom, and arbitrated in case of conflict. Many transactions of 
land took place at this time under these institutions in the absence of proper legal 
documentation. 
The land-use right was first established in the Land Law of 1987. While only the State can 
own land, a private person or entity can also own ‘use rights’ to a parcel of land for a 
specific period of time. However, due to unofficial rights of using land in the past, it has 
been very complicated to identify which piece of land should be allocated to whom. The 
2004 revision of the Land Law is an important milestone towards completing the land 
titling process. However, up to 2004, 28% of agricultural land was without land-use right 
certificates (LUC). The figure for urban land is not available but should be much higher due 
to urbanization and temporary occupation of land by immigrants. Consequently, despite the 
Government’s huge efforts, land occupation without legal title is still common and this is 
the main obstacle for business to gain access to land.  
Second, commercial and industrial land in urban areas is mainly in the hands of SOEs, 
whereas private firms face considerable difficulties in getting land. The ICS sample gives a 
sense of the magnitude of the problem. Among enterprises with 250 employees or more, 
SOEs have on average five times more land than private firms. To some extent, limited 
access to industrial land simply reflects the overwhelming population density and the 
ensuing shortage of idle space within urban boundaries. Most of the existing industrial land 
is already occupied by SOEs (they are automatically entitled to all areas they had in pre-
Doimoi time), whereas the conversion of agricultural land into industrial land at the fringes 
of the cities is a slow and often controversial process. Thus, the supply of available land 
coming on to the market is too small to meet the demand. In the period from 1994 to 2002, 
in Hanoi only 428 new rental contracts covering about 3 million square meters were issued. 
More than half of these contracts were to SOEs. By now, an overwhelming 95 percent of 
land under lease to organizations in Hanoi is in the hands of SOEs, leaving less than 5 
percent to private firms, cooperatives and other production groups (Joint Donor Report 
2005). 
Officially, SOEs are not allowed to sub-lease their land to other enterprises, but they do so 
in practice. In the small-scale enterprise survey conducted by the World Bank, 11 percent of 
the respondents had rented land from SOEs. Since these leases are not legal and typically 
short term (less than 10 years), private enterprises are put in a risky position with high   24
uncertainty. Furthermore, due to illegal leases, the rents that private enterprises pay to SOEs 
cannot be counted as a tax-deductible expense. This puts enterprises in a vulnerable 
position. In addition, revenues from sub-leasing land are not recorded in the accounts of 
SOEs. This is potentially important source for corruption and gives SOEs an incentive not 
to return to the State land that is not required for the conduct of business operations, as 
stipulated in Land Law. 
Third, rapid economic development and urbanization has raised the demand for converting 
agricultural land into land for industrial, residential, commercial, and infrastructure 
purposes. By the end of 2004, there were 192 major industrial zones and clusters in 13 
provinces, with a total area close to 30 thousand hectares of land. Originally, some 84 
percent of this land was agricultural. It was recovered from over 100 thousand households.  
The most common recovery procedure was the compulsory recall of farmers’ LUCs by the 
state with compensation. Due to the gap between the market price and state compensation,
25 
land conversion has been resisted by the affected households, leading to social unrest and 
considerable delays in land clearance. A recent assessment of the implementation of the 
new Land Law 2004 by MONRE included a review of 17,480 denunciation letters, more 
than 70 percent of which were related to site clearance and compensation. 
Last but not least is corruption involved in land clearance and transactions 
Therefore, to the solve problem of land access for private firms, the following steps should 
be carried out simultaneously:  
-  hastening the process of allocating land-use rights to households; 
-  pushing forward the equitization/restructuring of SOEs to make land that they are 
occupying marketable (so it can be leased or sold); 
-  the land conversion process should be based on market mechanisms that promote 
communication between enterprises that need land and land holders, rather than on 
purely administrative means. land holders should be willing to transfer their lands 
voluntarily, rather than under administrative pressure. The model of land holders’ 
contributing land as capital to become stockholders of an enterprise (Box 3) can be a 
good model in solving the problem of land conversion.  
Box 3: The whole hamlet contributes farming land to establish a company 
In Bac Vong Hamlet, Bac Phu Commune, Soc Soc District in the outskirts of Hanoi is a farming 
locality with 800 laborers. In early 2003, Mr. Thuc (an agricultural engineer) proposed that 
farmers consolidate their land and use the value of the land as capital contributions to start a big 
business, challenging the notion that investments should be made only in small businesses and 
that farmers are not willing to take large risks. His idea was well received by the municipal 
authorities, the Party cell and the farmers. Investors, like the Central Seeds Company No. 1 and 
                                                        
25 In fact, due to the underdeveloped real estate market in Vietnam, it is difficult to estimate a marketable price 
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Viet Ha Beer Company, also supported this idea and cooperated in doing business. 
In early May 2004, 227 farmer households signed contracts to contribute their small farming 
land areas to the company and effectively became shareholders of the company; while another 
43 households signed contracts for the long-term lease of their lands to the company. A big 
business plan, using the capital from the land contributed by the farmers, is being carried out. 
With this method, Bac Vong Shareholding Company had 50 hectares of land at the time of its 
establishment without incurring any costs for compensation or clearance. 
       Source: Law Newspaper of Ho Chi Minh City, 14 July 2004. 
 
Private sector participation in infrastructure development and public services provision 
Infrastructure and public services in Vietnam are still underdeveloped. Studies in 
development show that development of infrastructure and public services is essential 
condition for economic growth.
26 According to the Government’s forecast in 2000 (World 
Bank 2000), Vietnam must commit around 12% GDP annually in order to meet the 
infrastructure needs of the nation. Of this, the state budget and donor community can only 
finance at most of 5% of GDP, leaving at least 7% GDP for private and foreign investors. 
There are some prominent characteristics of investment in infrastructure and public services 
that make it difficult for attracting private investment:  
-  high capital cost and long life of operation imply high risks;  
-  it may generate highly positive externalities to the economy and society, but may 
generate low internal benefits for investors; 
-  it may have a wide consumer base, but this does not guarantee a ‘willingness to pay’.  
Due to these characteristics, traditionally investments in infrastructure and public services 
are believed to be state responsibilities. However the increasing gap between the need to 
improve the quality and availability of infrastructure and public services, on the one hand, 
and the limited public financial resources, on the other hand, requires the involvement of 
the private sector. The government can stimulate private infrastructure investment, leading 
to improvements in the quantity and quality of public services, while lowering their cost. 
For example, increased competition in infrastructure (e.g. electricity), tariff increases 
toward cost recovery (e.g. water and transport), hard budget constraints on public utilities, 
and so on, can stimulate private investment and generate large fiscal savings. 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are defined as privately financed infrastructure projects 
in which a private firm either: (i) sells its services to the government; or (ii) sells its 
services to third parties with significant fiscal support in the form of guarantees. PPPs may 
generate benefits for the economy such as fiscal savings, enlargement of national assets and 
their externalities, but they entail risks as well.  
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roads would increase GDP by about $1.50. However, the study indicates that the marginal benefit–cost ratio 
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In Vietnam so far there are two forms of PPP available. In the first, the Government 
commits itself to purchase the output of the private partner. In practice, many SOEs, 
especially in construction sector, have contracted with private companies in this form. 
However due to unclear procedures in bidding for these contracts, this form of cooperation 
is usually criticized as a mechanism for corrupting managers of SOEs. The publicized 
corruption case of PMU 18 is evidence for this criticism, when many managers’ relatives in 
this ‘corporation’ established enterprises for supplying services and input for projects under 
the management of PMU 18 with favorable prices.  
In the second form, final users purchase the services supplied by the private partner (e.g. 
Build-Own-Operate), but the Government provides financial support in the form of 
guarantees. However if the project is unprofitable, the Government has to spend large sums 
for support and this may cause large budget deficits.
27  
In summary, given the sheer volume of investments needed in Vietnam, the Government 
should be ambitious in seeking private participation in infrastructure. To support this trend, 
some institutions should be established to support the development of markets for 
infrastructure services when some form of competition is possible. The aim here is to 
develop rules for private providers to access to the market, to settle disputes and, 
occasionally, to set the price of services in a way that would ‘mimic’ the outcomes of a 
competitive market, despite all the network effects, social objectives and the like. 
Improvement of Competition Law and its enforcement 
Currently, it is too soon to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the Competition 
Law. However, there are some initial signs that most enterprises and consumers have had 
no faith in the enforcement effectiveness of the competition legal framework and the 
competition authorities. The ‘collision’ in telecommunication interconnection between 
Military Telecommunication Company (Viettel) and Vietnam’s Post and 
Telecommunication Corporation (VNPT- a state giant) in 2005 is a typical case. To resolve 
the dispute, both companies immediately lodged a complaint with the Prime Minister rather 
than to the Competition Commission (Vietnam’s Competition Administration Department 
VCAD, a statutory body directly under Ministry of Trade). Additionally, up to now, there 
have been very few complaints with VCAD about anti-competitive practices, although in 
reality violations of the Competition Law have been rampant. For example, many 
enterprises, especially SOEs, have abused their dominant or monopoly position in large 
regions by compelling farmers to undersell agricultural products to them.  
There are several reasons for the lack of fatih in the effectiveness of the law enforcement 
and competence of the VCAD. 
 First, the competition authorities up till now are weak. The Vietnam Competition Council 
(VCC), which is in charge of judging disputes, is not yet operational.
28 Meanwhile, the 
VCAD, depending purely on the state budget, does not have the necessary resources, staff, 
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28 Only on 9 January 2006, the Prime Ministry signed Decree 05/2006/ND-CP on the establishment and 
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and reputation to deal with violation cases. Competition authorities such as VCAD and 
VCC do not have independent legal status (VCAD is a unit of Ministry of Trade and its 
head appointed by Minister of Trade; the VCC is also an executive body).
 29 Hence 
enterprises and consumers do not trust the neutrality or objectivity of these agencies in 
settling their disputes. This has created a practice of seeking recourse to the Primer Minister 
for help in dispute resolution and has created a ‘bad’ precedence in law enforcement. 
Second, protection of consumer interests is rather new in Vietnam’s legal framework, even 
to consumers. Therefore, with limited knowledge of the law and lack of faith in the courts, 
Vietnam’s consumers are hesitant to lodge a complaint/appeal. Dispute resolution has 
largely been conducted via negotiation. For instance, according to Vietnam’s Office of 
Consumer Protection in Hanoi, in the first half of 2005, it accepted nearly 100 complaints 
about violations of the lawful interests of consumers, but 70% of the complaints were 
settled by negotiation. 
Third, it seems that the Government has not been strong in enhancing fair competition and 
fighting against monopoly, especially that of SOEs. The SOEs obtained their dominant 
market position or monopoly position via state protection, rather than via competition. 
Though the Competition Law has laid initial legal grounds for combating monopoly, the 
state administration bodies have not pushed such action in respect of the state-enterprise 
giants.   
Enhancing the effectiveness of law enforcement is of high importance, but this objective is 
not easily achieved in the short term and even in medium term. This requires enormous 
efforts and comprehensive measures of the Government.  
The international experience, particularly of Thailand, has shown that having a competition 
law is necessary but not sufficient condition for creating a competitive environment. 
Thailand promulgated its competition law in 1995, but its effectiveness has been limited. 
This fact is usually attributed to lack of the necessary resources, political will, and 
neutrality of the competition authorities. Some researchers (e.g. Brooks 2005)) argue that in 
order to have a more effective and fairer competition environment, developing countries 
should simultaneously build effective institutions to protect property rights in general and 
intellectual property rights in particular, create a credible and neutral/independent legal 
system and intensify trade and investment liberalization. Singapore till recently had no 
competition law, but owing to the existence of these ‘supporting’ institutions, it has had a 
quite healthy competitive environment and high competitiveness in comparison with other 
nations in the region and in the world. 
These experiences imply that in the long term, along with establishing competition-
supporting institutions, Vietnam should make greater efforts in implementation of the law, 
especially in establishing efficient competition authorities with a higher legal and neutrality 
status (at least in the perception of businesses and consumers). In the short term, it is 
necessary to increase the creditability and capability of VCAD by making it more neutral 
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and more independent in terms of finance. A mechanism for efficient cooperation between 
VCAD and industry competition-related regulators in settling breaches of the Competition 
Law is also needed.
30 
It is worth noting that the implementation of Competition Law or competition policy should 
go closely with the improvement of institutions dealing with market exit. At present, 
Vietnam’s institutions dealing with bankruptcy are extremely ineffective. Since the 
Bankruptcy Law was promulgated in 1995, there have been only few bankruptcy cases 
proceeded by formal procedures. According to the Report on Business Environment 2007 
by the World Bank and IFC (2006), it takes about 5 years and the cost of 15% of total assets 
to  resolve a bankruptcy case by formal procedures. 
V. Key lessons from reform process and microeconomic foundation improvements 
After the reunification in 1975, Vietnam shifted its focus on reconstruction and socio-
economic development. The failure of the economic development that closely followed the 
centrally planned model forced Vietnam to undertake microeconomic reforms in the early 
1980s. However, only the Doi Moi in 1986 and especially the radical market-oriented 
reform of 1989 marked a turning point in the history of Vietnam’s economic development. 
Since the 1989 reforms, the face of Vietnam’s economy and society has changed 
significantly. Vietnam has recorded remarkable achievements in terms of GDP growth, 
macroeconomic stabilization, export expansion, and poverty reduction.  
During 20 years of Doi moi Vietnam has changed substantially in its way of thought, in the 
‘rules of games’ (formal and informal rules), in the ‘playing of games’ 
(mechanisms/sanctions) and in the ‘players of the game’ (business entities, government 
agencies, consumers and their behaviors). Major fundamental institutions for a market 
economy such as prices for goods and services, a legal framework for property and 
commercial transactions, private ownership, a two-tier banking system, and a tax system, 
have gradually been established.  
There is now consensus that the achievements in Vietnam can be attributed to four key 
factors: (1) the acknowledgment of the right of private business and establishment of 
institutions for market transactions; (2) the market-oriented reforms (especially in terms of 
price liberalization and structural reforms); (3) the opening (mostly in terms of trade and 
FDI) and integrating of the economy into the regional and world economy; and (4) the 
keeping of macroeconomic and social stability. In nature, the economic reform process is to 
grant rights and to enlarge opportunities for people in choosing and deciding the directions 
and forms of their production and business activities. These factors have motivated 
economic behavior changes and once they are gradually locked-in, it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, for Vietnam to return to the previous economic management system. 
There are several interrelated lessons, which can be withdrawn from Vietnam’s 
experience.
31 
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and accordingly, both the Ministry of Finance and VCAD (the Ministry of Trade) are responsible for dealing 
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-  First, effective reforms require both political will, changes in the way of thought and 
policy decisions reflecting the dynamics of real life. The microeconomic reforms 
introduced in the early of 1980s recognized and legalized the people’s spontaneous 
measures to operate outside the plan, so they can be seen as ‘bottom up’ reforms. The 
failure of the efforts to stabilize the economy up until 1989 and of the last attempts to 
control the free market during the period 1985-88 as well as the drying up of aid from 
the former Soviet Union had created a strongest pressure on reform. The slogans ‘let 
markets be untied’ and ‘let rescue by yourself’ in fact reflected the nature of the 
relatively radical reform package in 1989.  
-  Second, since Vietnam has been an agrarian economy in transition, where economic 
policies and implementation procedures are still a legacy of a centrally planned 
economy, the approach to and the way of reform implementation are very essential for 
ensuring success, while keeping social and political stability. The ‘bottom up’ reforms 
first launched in rural areas were relatively easy as they satisfied the people’s 
willingness, and the political situation in rural areas was not as complicated as in urban 
areas. In general, the economic reform in Vietnam has been a process of 'learning by 
doing' and characterized by gradualism. This approach has several advantages since it 
can avoid the crisis/collapse of the economy, while gradually gaining the confidence in 
and the support for reform as the people see the successful outcomes of reforms.  
-  Third, selection of the reform approach is not only driven by the targets the reforms 
should achieve, but it is also based on the structure of existing institutions. In a broader 
view, it can be seen that underlying Vietnam's (and China’s) reforms is a series of 
institutional changes in novel forms of transitional institutions. These institutions could 
work because they achieved two objectives at the same time — they improved 
economic efficiency on the one hand, and made the reform a win-win game and 
interest-compatible for those in power on the other hand. These institutional reforms 
were not created ‘solely for increasing the size of the pie, but also reflecting the 
distributional concerns of how the enlarged pie is divided and the political concerns of 
how the interest of those in power are served’ (Qian 2001).  
-  Fourth, pursuing an approach of gradualism does not mean that the focus should be first 
solely on reforms at the microeconomic level. Vietnam’s experience in 1980s has 
shown that the partial reform measures could be good, but not good enough. They 
should be undertaken within more comprehensive reforms, especially in conjunction 
with macroeconomic reforms and the opening of the economy. Macroeconomic stability 
and ‘getting the prices right’ are as essential as ensuring ownership and creating 
business opportunities.   
-  Fifth, one cannot understand the economic reform in Vietnam without examining 
carefully the ‘turning points’ associated with significant institutional changes. An 
important example is the reforms in 1989. Vietnam’s radical reform package launched 
in 1989 was an exception in the context of gradualism, but its outcome was very 
different in comparison to the experiences of many transitional economies in Eastern 
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Europe, although the liberalization and stabilization measures used were similar to these 
economies (Riedel and Comer 1997). The gradual approach did not work well in 
Vietnam until the 1989-reform was launched. It was forced to happen under the 
pressures of macroeconomic instability, crisis and the ‘drying up’ of aid from the 
former Soviet Union. Surprisingly, the 1989-reform outcomes were very impressive, 
although it was implemented without the technical and financial assistance from 
international institutions such as IMF or World Bank. The economic reform package in 
1989 is considered most successful since the basic conditions were created for the 
transformation into a market-oriented economy.  
-  Last but not least, a firm recognition of private ownership and rights of doing business 
is a very essential condition for business development. But not less important for the 
sustainable development of an efficient private sector are administrative reforms, a 
building of a level playing field, which id closely associated with the structural reforms, 
and the development of factor markets. Otherwise, the private sector cannot develop ‘to 
the top’ and play a significant role in infrastructure development and public service 
provision. The risk of effective PPPs is also higher when government transparency and 
accountability is not ensured and corruption is rampant. 
Putting all aspects together, it can be said that the enlargement of business choices (created 
by both domestic market reform and integration), macroeconomic stability, institutional 
incentives (not ‘money’ incentives), policy credibility, and easier access to the production 
factors are the keys for a healthy development of private sector.  
As in other transition economies, Vietnam’s reform process has also been uneven. It was 
recognized even in 1996 that the reforms were limited and were not keeping pace with 
economic development. Moreover, the reform process in general slowed down during the 
period 1996-99, especially after the Asian crisis. The years 2000-05 witnessed new 
commitments to reform continuation and some progress were made, especially in the 
development of private sector and trade liberalization and integration. Meanwhile, the 
reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the banking system, and public administration 
were slower than expected and this has limited the effectiveness and efficiency of other 
reforms. Moreover, the policy measures implemented in some cases have been not 
comprehensive enough and/or not consistent with market-oriented reforms and process of 
integration, even when Vietnam recognized the serious weaknesses of its economy. A main 
reason, of course, is rooted in a legacy of a centrally planned economy, which is reflected in 
the ways of directing and controlling resources, especially capital allocation, and dealing 
with the SOE sector.  
The explanation can be seen also in other ideological, economic and social factors. The 
Communist Party leadership has been considered a most decisive factor for guiding Doi 
Moi process and ensuring its success. The Party, on the one hand, has recognized its 
foundation ideology as being a compass needle for its general guidelines. On other hand, 
the Party has seen the need to have a new approach to its interpretation and application so 
that its leadership can effectively adapt to a new environment of a market-oriented and open   31
economy. For instance, Vietnam has accepted the necessity of a market mechanism, but at 
the same time it should be ‘under state management’ and /or ‘by socialist orientation’.  
This naturally has had a complex impact on the economic reform process. In Vietnam, the 
concept of ‘socialist orientation’ has three dimensions.  
-  The first is based on an assessment of the role of the state sector, which is thought to 
play a leading role in the economy. In fact, the GDP growth has been still heavily 
dependent on the SOEs’ performance and driven by state investment, and this tendency 
seems to be continuing in recent years.
32 However, both state investment and the SOE 
sector have been recognized as inefficient, and moreover, corruption has been 
widespread in connection with state investment.  
-  The second is very much associated with the problems of ownership, especially that of 
factors of production, and income distribution. A concern is that an over-developed 
private sector would lead to the exploitation of people by people. There is also a 
concern about the social problems such as the gap between the poor and the rich and 
social stability in the process of international economic integration and SOE reform. As 
a result, it is hard to create ‘a level playing field’ in practice for all institutional 
economic sectors and the reform process has been sometimes characterized by ‘stop-
and-go’ policies. When efficiency and economic reforms are emphasized, this is not 
always easy to reconcile with this concept.  
-  The third is more or less directly attached to the goals of development, meaning that 
development is for the people, by the people, and of the people and Vietnam needs to 
strive for ‘Prosperous people, a forceful country, and an equitable, democratic and 
civilized society’. This approach, though it sounds beautiful, does not provide much 
concrete policy guidance.  
As a result, there has been some embarrassment in interpreting the concept of ‘socialist 
orientation’ in connection with the major aspects of development (which are shown in the 
figure below). An example is the role of the state sector/SOE sector in a market economy or 
in industrialization. Another is social value in the process of development by socialist 
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investment expenditure, state credit and owned outlays by the SOEs) accounts for more than 50% of total 
investment.   32
Moreover, the concept of ‘socialist orientation’ is sensitive to changes in the region and in 
the world. For example, the intense arguments for and against globalization could heavily 
bias approaches to reforms toward the political and social conceptual realities in Vietnam, 
emphasizing the dangers of global markets. For example, the Asian crisis and the socio-
political turbulence in some countries were seen differently in Vietnam.  
Finally, there is the problem of asymmetry in incentives for those supporting or opposing 
reforms, depending on whether they will be winners or losers. For instance, in general, most 
people will benefit from the reduction of trade barriers, while the inefficient and highly 
protected enterprises will have difficulties surviving in the new market environment. A 
complex package of reforms means the involvement of many participants with different 
motives. Benefits for the many are merely potential gains without certainty and therefore 
reactions may not be concerted and strong. For those with vested interests, however, the 
loss of benefits through reduced protection and limited public advantage is real, but they are 
still in a position to influence the decision. This can be seen in the case of Vietnam, where 
the administrative way of managing the economy has created close mutually beneficial 
connections between the line ministries and the SOE sector as a whole and the State 
General Corporations in particular. The problem of conflict of interests is difficult to attack 
effectively since vested interest groups can use the same political and social arguments as 
above to justify the status quo. 
All these ideological, economic and social factors have also had significant impacts on the 
process of policy and decision making and ‘rule of law’ enforcement in Vietnam. In recent 
years, both review and consultation involved in the policy development process have been 
considerably improved.
33 It has taken into account more seriously the consultation with and 
feedback from all stakeholders, such as various government agencies, the business 
community, social organizations (including NGOs), and experts or technocrats. But there 
remain several problems. 
-  Regulations have in many cases been developed by the public agencies/ministries that 
are responsible for implementation and enforcement. The role of non-state or non-party 
organizations has rarely been about developing new ideas and key principles for 
regulation-making, but limited to comments on the inappropriateness of some articles or 
the negative impacts of the regulations they can observe. The participation of 
stakeholders can improve good regulations, but rarely prevents the implementation of 
bad ones. As a result, the problem of conflict of interests can arise.  
-  This problem can become more serious due to the complexity of the ‘principal–agent’ 
problem in Vietnam. The concern is often about the agents. However, the principal’s 
interests are not always clear cut due to the fact that bureaucrats function in the 
government hierarchy, but they are often appointed to a post by the Party and also under 
Party leadership. Together with different interpretations of the concept ‘socialist 
orientation’, this limits transparency, accountability, responsibility and thoroughness in 
regulation and policy implementation. This is also a major cause of weak coordination 
                                                        
33 See Dee (2006) for a policy development system working in an ideal fashion.    33
and information sharing among government agencies. In many cases, the consultations 
between and feedback from ministries for comments and suggestions have been 
formalistic. Moreover, this narrows significantly the scope for an independent and 
effective review and supervision over the policy and regulation implementation. 
-  Even when the problem is well identified, state intervention is often preferred to the use 
of other institutions. This is a result of both the legacy of a centrally-panned economy 
and pressure from vested interest groups. Lack of cost-benefit analysis of alternative 
measures/instruments also limits the effectiveness and efficiency of the state 
interventions, when they are necessary.  
An attempt to avoid those mentioned problems is to form a so-called Taskforce. A typical 
example was the Enterprise Law Enforcement Taskforce (Box 4). Note that at the end of 
2004, a similar taskforce was suggested for implementation of the Land Law. Regretfully, 
the suggestion was not undertaken (CIEM and GTZ 2006). 
Box 4: Successes and the lack of sustainability of the Enterprise Law Enforcement Taskforce 
This Taskforce was established in December 1999 when the implementation of the Enterprise Law 
1999 was at risk of lagging significantly behind schedule. The Taskforce had played an essential 
role in enforcing the Enterprise Law and in removing unnecessary business licenses. It has been 
regarded as a good example in law implementation and highly appreciated by the business 
community and a number of stakeholders. The operation of the Taskforce, however, was not 
sustainable.  
The success of the Taskforce can be attributed to external and internal factors. The former includes 
two factors. The first is the strong political commitment of the Party and Government to legal 
reform and to business environment improvement. In fact, the Taskforce is an advisory body to the 
Prime Ministry and hence, benefited a great deal from the direct support of the Prime Minister. The 
second is the wide support by many economists, researchers, media and the business community. 
The latter also includes two factors. First, the Taskforce is a team of members who are market 
reform minded, fully committed to economic reforms, and professionally independent (though they 
are still part of the administrative system). Second, it has a reasonable working mode and does not 
baulk at sensitive issues. The concrete conditions and actual context of all involved stakeholders are 
always taken into full account in any of its proposals. 
The reasons for the lack of sustainability in the operation of the Taskforce are as follows. 
-  At the beginning it is stated that the Taskforce operation is short-term and ad-hoc in nature. 
-  As time goes by, the external enabling factors have declined. Many reasonable proposals by the 
Taskforce were not considered and accepted. Many measures taken were against the Enterprise 
Law. These factors have dampened and depleted the energy of the Taskforce.  
-  As most members have to devote only part of their working time to the Taskforce, they tend to 
spend more and more time on the work at their organization. 
-  The work ‘not included in the Taskforce meeting’ was not clarified. There is no mechanism to 
protect the Taskforce members when they performed the tasks that were not identified or 
assigned in the Taskforce meetings, despite the fact that such tasks fell into the task list of the 
Taskforce. This fact gradually decreased the independence of members, particularly of standing 
members. Since then, the work of the Taskforce has become more ‘administrative’. 
            Source: CIEM and GTZ (2006). 
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VI. Concluding remarks  
The dream and expectation of Vietnam to be a civilized society and an industrialized 
country have always been the focus of her development strategy. In the past, however, 
Vietnam failed to bring its dream into reality mainly because it pursued a centrally planning 
system — an institution lacking incentives and efficient resource allocation. With the Doi 
Moi and market-oriented reforms, Vietnam has not only entered a new stage of 
development, but also had a good opportunity to be successful in industrializing and 
modernizing its economy. 
The development goals of Vietnam over the first two decades of the New Millennium are 
quite ambitious. They are to sustain high economic growth, to escape the status of a poor 
country by 2010, and to become ‘a modern-oriented industrialized country’ by 2020. 
In order to achieve these development goals, Vietnam has no choice but to continue Doi 
Moi process. The first and foremost factor for overcoming the obstacles on the road to 
prosperity is to change the still state-led economic institutions into efficiency-enhancing 
institutions with more people participation and an essential role for the private sector. The 
reforms should also be consistent with the process of building a market economy and 
international integration. It is not an exaggeration to say that the reform process in Vietnam 
has been an international commitment-based reform process. Moreover, the economic, 
administrative and political reforms need to be implemented in a more synchronous 
manner.  
Overall, institutional reform and human resource development should be priorities. The 
limitations and constraints in institutions also mean that there is much room for Vietnam to 
change in order to create an incentive environment for advancing and even leapfrogging the 
industrialization and modernization of its country. The institutional changes together with 
skill formation will be a very effective insurance measure. This is because they enlarge both 
the set of choices by people and their capability to exploit benefits from the newer choices. 
As a result, people and firms become less vulnerable to the changes in the economy and 
society.   35
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